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This May’s General Election saw the end of the first full coalition in post-war British politics, between the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The partnership  brought together two parties with distinct constitutional
philosophies, and entailed a trade-off between principle and pragmatism which saw the latter’s electoral
evisceration. Felicity Matthews looks both backwards over the last five years and forward to the next five, and
argues that the coalition’s period in government makes likely an ever-greater dissonance between constitutional
norms and the reality of governing as a majority Conservative administration. 
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In the run-up to the 2015 general election constitutional affairs were centre-stage, the debate dominated by issues
including Scotland’s relationship with Westminster and Britain’s place in Europe. Upon assuming office, the
Conservative Government pledged a package of reforms that would simultaneously witness the repatriation of
sovereignty and the dispersal of power across the Union. As the architecture of UK teeters on the precipice of
fundamental upheaval, it is crucial to locate recent events within the broader context of constitutional reform; and my
research provides the first in-depth analysis of the 2010-15 Coalition Government’s record on the constitution,
focusing on the gap between rhetoric and reform.
Constitutional reform assumed a pivotal role in the coalition negotiations of 2010; and it was only when the
Conservatives made key concessions regarding electoral reform that the prospect of a Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition emerged. Nonetheless, the burden of compromise fell heaviest on the Liberal Democrats; and
within the Programme for Government coalition agreement a significant number of their flagship policies were
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diluted (e.g. electoral reform), forestalled (e.g. House of Lords reform) or disregarded entirely (e.g. UK-wide
federalism).
The constitutional reform pledges within in the Programme for Government map onto six key areas: parliamentary
reform; electoral reform; Europe; decentralisation; transparency and freedom of information; and, a written
constitution. A distinction can be made between those reforms intended to transform the core of Westminster
government (i.e. parliamentary reform and electoral reform); and the wider relationships between the core and
periphery of the British state (i.e. Europe and decentralisation). Progress was variable. Reforms relating on the
balance of power within Westminster were generally been moderate and focused on matters of ‘efficiency’ rather
than ‘effectiveness’; and whilst electoral reform would have had fundamental consequences for the balance of
power within the House, its rejection at referendum effectively insulated this key aspect of the ‘mega-constitution’. A
distinction can also be made between the moderate scope of the Coaliton’s planned reforms, and the fundamental
scope of the reforms pledged as a knee-jerk response to the inadequately anticipated consequences of the Scottish
independence referendum.
Several dynamics account for this record. The formation of the Coalition brought together two parties with distinct
constitutional philosophies, and entailed a trade-off between principle and pragmatism. The traditional ethos of the
Conservative Party has been to countenance incremental change to maintain existing institutions, whilst eschewing
measures that would radically depart from accepted practices.  n contrast, the Liberal Democrats consciously
positioned themselves as the main party political advocates of radical constitutional reform, with successive
manifestos setting out their commitment to the fundamental re-balancing of power within the British state.
The willingness of the Liberal Democrats to compromise on some of their erstwhile ‘red lines’ therefore reflects the
dilemmas faced by the Party in the transition from opposition to government.  One the one hand, entering into
Coalition with the Conservatives provided opportunity for the Party to put the language of compromise and power-
sharing into practice. Yet, on the other hand, in the midst of economic crisis, the diversion of resources to arcane
matters of the constitution would constitute a high-risk strategy for a party keen to demonstrate its credentials as a
serious party of government. The Liberal Democrats’ reformist tradition was therefore confronted by the dilemmas of
securing and maintaining executive power.
This dilemma draws attention to the normative appeal of the constitutional structures that sustain Westminster
government.  Whilst British constitution rests on the fundamental principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the elision
with ‘executive sovereignty’ provides a legitimating discourse that promotes strong, responsible government; and
that precludes attempts to recast the structures that work to the advantage of those in office.  Thus, despite the raft
of pledges contained in the Programme of Government, the cornerstones of the constitution remained largely
untouched.  There was also is evidence that the norms of adversarial majoritarianism associated with Westminster
politics imbued the behaviour of those within the Coalition, illustrated by the way that the Liberal Democrats
withdrew support for boundary support in retaliation for the collapse of the House of Lords Reform Bill in 2012.
 
This ‘logic of appropriateness’ therefore continued to both describe the dispersal of power across the British state
and prescribe the boundaries of appropriate reforms. It also inhibited meaningful debate regarding the tenability of
the existing constitutional settlement. Nowhere was this more apparent than with regards the Scottish independence
referendum and the subsequent commitment to devo-max. Whilst David Cameron’s support can be interpreted an
attempt to manage tensions and preserve the fabric of the Union, the hitherto complacency that had characterised
the ‘Better Together’ campaign, and the hurried reaction to unfavourable polling, suggest a lack of forethought and a
failure to adequately acknowledge the depth of the constitutional fissures created in 1998 when the journey of
asymmetrical devolution was embarked upon.
Debates regarding the UK’s constitutional settlement are set to remain prominent over the course of this parliament.
In particular, the extension of devolution and its knock-on consequences are likely to predominate. Whilst the
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Government has pledged to implement the Smith Commission and the St David’s Day Agreement, in October they
pushed through plans to grant English MPs a veto over English laws. Widely regarded as a nakedly partisan move,
the introduction of ‘EVEL’ would equip the Conservatives with an inbuilt majority on all ‘domestic’ issues within
Parliament.
Clearly, the prospect of an interminable Conservative majority is unacceptable to Labour who, until 1997, could only
form majorities in the House because of their strength in Scotland. However, their dramatic collapse in Scotland has
not only cut its seats to just one, but has also split the opposition and thrust the SNP to the fore as the UK’s third
party. The splintering of the vote in Scotland in turn points to a further source of constitutional instability, as the
changing nature of party competition and the vagaries of the electoral system have once again challenged the
legitimacy of one of the cornerstones of the UK’s ‘mega-constitution.’  And, of course, there is still the great ‘known
unknown’ lurking on the political horizon: the referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU, set to be
held by the end of 2017.
The scale of the manifold challenges and constitutional pressures that the Conservative Government will have to
manage is apparent. And yet, my research suggests that the attractiveness of Westminster norms have thus far
discouraged constitutional entrepreneurialism and limited the supply of ‘supreme altruism’ necessary to secure
reform. Nonetheless, as this parliament progresses, the dissonance between constitutional norms and governing
reality may prove too loud to ignore.
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